37-45-111. Notice of hearing on petition.
Statute text
(1) Immediately after the filing of such petition, the court wherein such petition is filed, by order, shall fix a place and time, not less than sixty days nor more than ninety days after the petition is filed, for hearing thereon, and thereupon the clerk of said court shall cause notice by publication to be made of the pendency of the petition and of the time and place of hearing thereon; the clerk of said court shall also forthwith cause a copy of said notice to be mailed by United States registered mail to the board of county commissioners of each of the several counties having territory within the proposed district.
(2) The district court in and for the county in which the petition for the organization of a water conservancy district has been filed shall thereafter for all purposes of this article, except as otherwise provided in this article, maintain and have original and exclusive jurisdiction coextensive with the boundaries of said water conservancy district and of land and other property proposed to be included in said district or affected by said district, without regard to the usual limits of its jurisdiction.
(3) No judge of such court wherein such petition is filed shall be disqualified to perform any duty imposed by this article by reason of ownership of property within any water conservancy district or proposed water conservancy district or by reason of ownership of any property that may be benefited, taxed, or assessed therein.
History
Source: L. 37: p. 1316, 6. CSA: C. 173B, 20. CRS 53: 149-6-6. C.R.S. 1963: 150-5-6.
Annotations
ANNOTATION
Annotations
Analysis
I. General Consideration.
II. Hearing Date.
III. Judicial Supervision.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
The sufficiency of the petition giving the court jurisdiction is to be determined on the record at the time of the hearing fixed in the order of publication and not otherwise. Hill v. District Court, 134 Colo. 369, 304 P.2d 888 (1956).
II. HEARING DATE.
Date of hearing is the date when pleadings are placed at issue. The wording of this section, requiring the setting of a hearing "not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days after the petition is filed" is a date which puts the respective petitions and pleadings at issue, the final determination of which lies in the sound discretion of the trial court in accordance with the evidence introduced. Hill v. District Court, 134 Colo. 369, 304 P.2d 888 (1956).
In the act there is a clear mandate that the courts act with all convenient speed to determine a matter of great public importance. However, this speed is for the benefit of the petitioners of a proposed district. As long as the matter is inactive objectors have lost nothing. Hill v. District Court, 134 Colo. 369, 304 P.2d 888 (1956).
The objectors to a petition for formation of a water conservancy district are not prejudiced by the continuation of the hearing thereon. Hill v. District Court, 134 Colo. 369, 304 P.2d 888 (1956).
A continuation does not divest the court of jurisdiction. Since the general assembly has provided that certain objections may be filed up to and including the date set for hearing, a petition for formation of a water conservancy district cannot stand fully at issue until the date of the hearing itself, and continuation of the hearing date beyond that set forth in the published notice does not divest the court of jurisdiction. Hill v. District Court, 134 Colo. 369, 304 P.2d 888 (1956).
III. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION.
This article, particularly subsection (2), grants the district court authority to supervise only the organization and incorporation of water conservancy districts. Peaker v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 174 Colo. 210, 483 P.2d 232 (1971).
Any authority exercised by the district court following the organization and incorporation is limited to clear statutory provisions such as the filling of vacancies in the board of directors and is nongeneral in nature. Peaker v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 174 Colo. 210, 483 P.2d 232 (1971).
It is improper for a district judge to maintain, in an official capacity, a close personal and financial relationship with a district. Such association is violative of the judicial impartiality requisite for the proper functioning of an adversary system of justice. Peaker v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 174 Colo. 210, 483 P.2d 232 (1971).