31-4-211. City manager - powers and responsibility.

Statute text

(1) The city manager is responsible to the city council for the proper administration of all affairs of the city placed in his charge and, to that end and except as otherwise provided in this part 2, he shall have the power to appoint and remove all officers and employees in the administrative service of the city except the city attorney and the municipal judge. Appointments made by the city manager shall be on the basis of executive and administrative ability, training, and experience of such appointees in the work which they are to perform. All such appointments shall be without definite term.

(2) Officers and employees appointed by the city manager may be removed by him at any time for cause. The decision of the city manager in any such case shall be final.

History

Source: L. 75: Entire title R&RE, p. 1030, 1, effective July 1.

Annotations

Editor's note: This section is similar to former 31-3-211 as it existed prior to 1975.

Annotations

 

ANNOTATION

Annotations

Denial of hearing not violation of due process. This section does not give rise to the type of expectancy to continued employment that serves as a ground for the existence of a property right protected by the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, no due process violation occurs in denying an employee a hearing on the city manager's decision to suspend or dismiss him. This is true regardless of whether the employee was gratuitously afforded an administrative hearing by the city manager, the procedural aspects of which were objected to by the employee. DeBono v. Vizas, 427 F. Supp. 905 (D. Colo. 1977).

This section clearly indicates that an employee holds his position subject to the final decision of the city manager. The general assembly thereby specifically excluded the necessity of providing any procedure for an administrative hearing either before or after the city manager's decision. DeBono v. Vizas, 427 F. Supp. 905 (D. Colo. 1977).

This section does not restrict the city manager's power to remove employees for particular causes. DeBono v. Vizas, 427 F. Supp. 905 (D. Colo. 1977).

The addition of the words "for cause" does not automatically create a constitutionally protected property right. The entire statutory purpose must be considered in making such a determination. DeBono v. Vizas, 427 F. Supp. 905 (D. Colo. 1977).

And public employment is generally not such right. Except in certain situations, as where an employee has formal tenure rights, public employment is generally not a constitutionally protected property interest. DeBono v. Vizas, 427 F. Supp. 905 (D. Colo. 1977).

An allegation that the city and city manager infringed a constitutionally protected liberty interest when they terminated plaintiff's employment for reasons that affected his reputation and ability to obtain other employment opportunities was prima facie insufficient to state a claim that defendants violated a liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment since every suspension or dismissal will necessarily affect one's community reputation and will make it more difficult to obtain future employment. DeBono v. Vizas, 427 F. Supp. 905 (D. Colo. 1977).

The "for cause" language in this section requires only that the city manager's decision not be arbitrary. DeBono v. Vizas, 427 F. Supp. 905 (D. Colo. 1977).

The power to remove employees included the power to suspend employees. DeBono v. Vizas, 427 F. Supp. 905 (D. Colo. 1977).

It is unclear whether the general assembly intended subsection (2) to confer on employees a protected property interest in continued employment. The statute's title and its language suggest that the legislature did not intend this particular statute to confer upon city employees an interest in their jobs. Rather, the legislature may have intended to clarify the powers of the city manager. Derda v. Brighton, Colo., City of, 53 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 1995).

Applied in Clouser v. City of Thornton, 676 F. Supp. 228 (D. Colo. 1987).