29-5-111. Liability of peace officers.

Statute text

(1) Notwithstanding the doctrines of sovereign immunity and respondeat superior, a city, town, county, or city and county or other political subdivision of the state or a state institution of higher education employing peace officers in accordance with article 7.5 of title 24, C.R.S., shall indemnify its paid peace officers and reserve officers, as defined in section 16-2.5-110, C.R.S., while the peace officers and reserve officers are on duty for any liability incurred by them and for any judgment, except a judgment for exemplary damages, entered against them for torts committed within the scope of their employment if the person claiming damages serves the political subdivision or state institution of higher education with a copy of the summons within ten days from the date when a copy of the summons is served on the peace officer or reserve officer. In no event shall any political subdivision or state institution of higher education be required so to indemnify its peace officers in excess of one hundred thousand dollars for one person in any single occurrence or three hundred thousand dollars for two or more persons for any single occurrence; except that in such instance no indemnity shall be allowed for any person in excess of one hundred thousand dollars. It is the duty of the city, town, county, city and county, or other political subdivision and of the state institution of higher education to provide the defense handled by the legal staff of the public entity or by other counsel, in the discretion of the public entity, for the peace officer in the claim or civil action. However, in the event that the court determines that a reserve officer, as defined in section 16-2.5-110, C.R.S., incurred the liability while acting outside the scope of his or her assigned duties or that the reserve officer acted in a willful and wanton manner in incurring the liability, the court shall order the reserve officer to reimburse the political subdivision or the state institution of higher education for reasonable costs and reasonable attorney fees expended for the defense of the reserve officer. With the approval of the governing body of the city, town, county, city and county, or other political subdivision or of the state institution of higher education, the claim or civil action may be settled or compromised. A city, town, county, city and county, or other political subdivision or a state institution of higher education may carry liability insurance to insure itself and its peace officers. If the political subdivision or state institution of higher education purchases insurance that provides substantial coverage for the peace officers with a policy limitation of at least one hundred thousand dollars for one person in any single occurrence and three hundred thousand dollars for two or more persons for any single occurrence, except that in such instance no indemnity shall be allowed for any person in excess of one hundred thousand dollars, then the political subdivision or state institution of higher education shall be liable under this section to indemnify the peace officers only to the extent of the limits and for such torts as are covered by the policy and only to the extent of the coverage of the policy. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to condone the conduct of any peace officer who uses excessive force or who violates the statutory or constitutional rights of any person.

(2) This section shall apply only with respect to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 1972.

History

Source: L. 71: pp. 1048, 1049, 1, 2. C.R.S. 1963: 99-2-12. L. 72: p. 612, 135. L. 88: (1) amended, p. 723, 5, effective July 1. L. 2003: (1) amended, p. 1618, 26, effective August 6. L. 2008: (1) amended, p. 92, 18, effective March 18. L. 2009: (1) amended, (SB 09-097), ch. 110, p. 459, 11, effective August 5.

Annotations

 

ANNOTATION

Annotations

Annotator's note. For further annotations dealing with public entity liability, immunity, and duty of care, see 24-10-106 and 24-10-106.5.

This section provides citizens a remedy for torts committed by police officers. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328 (10th Cir. 1981).

This section provides indemnification for liability incurred by peace officers and for judgments filed against them for torts committed within the scope of their employment. An action filed by the plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief may not be so characterized and does not entitle a peace officer to indemnification. City and County of Denver v. Blatnik, 32 P.3d 593 (Colo. App. 2001).

The clause "Notwithstanding the doctrines of sovereign immunity . . ." clearly operates as a waiver of immunity. Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000).

Requirements of the immunity act, 24-10-101 et seq., are extraneous to town's liability under this section. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975).

Liability different from that under immunity act. Secondary liability of a governmental entity as an indemnitor under this section is different and distinct from the direct liability imposed by the immunity act, 24-10-101 et seq. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975).

This section and 24-10-109 are not to be read together. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975).

This section and 24-10-110 conflict regarding the reimbursement of defense costs for level I peace officers. The Governmental Immunity Act pertains to governmental employees generally, while this section defines the rights of police officers specifically. It is well settled that, in the event of apparent statutory conflict, specific language overrides general language. Therefore, in light of the conflict between the two statutes, this section takes precedence. Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000).

Time limitations. The only time limitation, other than the statute of limitations, imposed upon one seeking to hold a governmental entity secondarily liable is the requirement contained within this section. Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975).

Immunity for tortious act of municipal officer deemed matter of concurrent local and state concern. Governmental immunity for tortious acts of municipal police officers and, specifically, limitations on compensatory damages for personal injuries in actions against municipal governments, based on such tortious conduct, are matters of concurrent local and statewide concern. Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979).

And municipality may increase compensation to tort victims. A municipality may provide greater monetary compensation to victims of torts committed by the municipality's own police officers than is provided under state statutes. Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979).

Whether a municipality provides its police officers with defense costs against tort actions is a matter of both state and local concern. Therefore, to the extent, if any, that the municipal charter conflicts with state law, this section supersedes the charter. Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000).

Applied in Forrest v. County Comm'rs, 629 P.2d 1105 (Colo. App. 1981); Beacom v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1983); Nowakowski v. Dist. Court, 664 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1983).