Statute text
As used in this part 6, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) Repealed.
(2) "Complying policy" means a policy of insurance that provides the coverages and is subject to the terms and conditions required by this part 6, and is certified by the insurer and the insurer has filed a certification with the commissioner that such policy, contract, or endorsement conforms to Colorado law and any rules promulgated by the commissioner.
(3) "Converter" means a person other than a named insured or resident relative who operates or uses a motor vehicle in a manner that a reasonable person would determine was unauthorized or beyond the scope of permission given by a named insured or resident relative. In determining whether a person is a converter, the following factors should be considered:
(a) The duration of the person's control over the motor vehicle;
(b) The circumstances surrounding the conduct of the person operating or using the motor vehicle; and
(c) The person's good faith.
(4) "Described motor vehicle" means the motor vehicle described in the complying policy.
(5) "Insured" means the named insured, relatives of the named insured who reside in the same household as the named insured, and any person using the described motor vehicle with the permission of the named insured.
(5.5) "Licensed health-care provider" means a person, corporation, facility, or institution licensed or certified by this state to provide health care or professional services as a hospital, health-care facility, or dispensary or to practice and practicing medicine, osteopathy, chiropractic, nursing, physical therapy, podiatry, dentistry, pharmacy, acupuncture, or optometry in this state, or an officer, employee, or agent of the person, corporation, facility, or institution working under the supervision of the person, corporation, facility, or institution in providing health-care services.
(6) "Motor vehicle" means a "motor vehicle" and a "low-power scooter", as both terms are defined in section 42-1-102, C.R.S.; except that "motor vehicle" does not include a toy vehicle, snowmobile, off-highway vehicle, or vehicle designed primarily for use on rails.
(7) "Nonpayment of premium" means failure of the named insured to discharge when due any obligations in connection with the payment of premiums on the policy, or any installment of such premium, whether the premium is payable directly to the insurer or its agent or indirectly under any premium finance plan or extension of credit.
(8) "Owner" means a person who holds the legal title to a vehicle; except that, if the vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or if a mortgagor of the vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this part 6.
(9) "Person" means every natural person, firm, partnership, association, or corporation.
(10) "Policy" means an automobile insurance policy providing coverage for all or any of the following coverages: Collision, comprehensive, bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments, and uninsured motorist coverage, or a combination automobile policy providing bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments, uninsured motorist, and physical damage coverage, delivered or issued for delivery in this state, insuring a single individual, or husband and wife, or family members residing in the same household, as named insured, and under which the insured vehicles therein designated are of the following types only:
(a) A motor vehicle of the private passenger or station wagon type that is not used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers nor rented to others pursuant to the terms of a motor vehicle rental agreement; or
(b) Any other four-wheel motor vehicle with a load capacity of fifteen hundred pounds or less that is not used in the occupation, profession, or business of the insured.
(11) "Renewal" or "to renew" means the issuance and delivery by an insurer of a policy replacing at the end of the policy period a policy previously issued and delivered by the same insurer or by an admitted company within the same insurance group, or the issuance and delivery of a certificate or notice extending the term of the policy beyond its policy period or term; but any policy with a policy period or term of less than six months shall, for the purpose of this part 6, be considered as if written for a policy period or term of six months; and any policy written for a term longer than one year, or any policy with no fixed expiration date, shall, for the purpose of this part 6, be considered as if written for successive policy periods or terms of one year, and such policy may be terminated at the expiration of any annual period upon giving twenty days' notice of cancellation prior to such anniversary date, and such cancellation shall not be subject to any other provisions of this part 6.
(12) Repealed.
(13) "Resident relative" means a person who, at the time of the accident, is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to the named insured or resident spouse and who resides in the named insured's household, even if temporarily living elsewhere, and any ward or foster child who usually resides with the named insured, even if temporarily living elsewhere.
(14) "Stacking" has the same meaning set forth in section 10-4-402 (3.5).
History
Source: L. 69: p. 549, 1. C.R.S. 1963: 72-30-1. L. 92: (4) added, p. 1759, 3, effective June 5. L. 95: (2)(a) amended, p. 142, 2, effective April 7. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 1558, 1, effective July 1; (1) amended and (1.5) and (3.5) added, p. 2554, 1, effective July 1. L. 2004: (6) amended, p. 11, 2, effective February 20. L. 2007: (1) and (12) repealed, p. 974, 3, effective May 18. L. 2009: (6) amended, (HB 09-1026), ch. 281, p. 1253, 1, effective July 1, 2010. L. 2010: (5.5) added, (HB 10-1220), ch. 197, p. 855, 18, effective July 1. L. 2016: (11) amended, (HB 16-1025), ch. 16, p. 36, 1, effective August 10.
Annotations
Editor's note: Amendments to this section by House Bill 03-1253 and House Bill 03-1188 were harmonized, resulting in the renumbering of provisions of this section.
Annotations
ANNOTATION
Annotations
Annotator's note. Since this section is similar to former 10-4-601 as it existed prior to its 2003 amendment and to 10-4-703 as it existed prior to the 2003 repeal of part 7 of article 4 of this title, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
The phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" does not suggest that the definitions contained in this section apply to all uninsured motorist coverage provisions. If such were the case, the language limiting the definitions to "this part 7" would always be overridden by the exception. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stein, 924 P.2d 1154 (Colo. App. 1996), aff'd, 940 P.2d 384 (Colo. 1997).
Policy provision cannot limit scope of insureds to whom compulsory coverage must be provided. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Home Ins. Co., 841 P.2d 354 (Colo. App. 1992).
The definition of "insured" under subsection (5) specifically allows liability coverage to be predicated upon using a motor vehicle described in the policy. The third category of "insureds" is, by definition, vehicle-dependent. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Anderson, 260 P.3d 68 (Colo. App. 2010).
The plain import of subsection (6) is that an insurer is not required to extend coverage to any person who uses the vehicle without the permission of the named insured. The permissive use exclusion in insured's insurance policy is not in violation of the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act because it does not limit the compulsory classification of insureds to whom the insurer is obligated to provide coverage. The provision constitutes a valid exclusion by which a non-permissive user of a vehicle is exempt from coverage as an insured pursuant to the statute. Winscom v. Garza, 843 P.2d 126 (Colo. App. 1992); McConnell v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 906 P.2d 109 (Colo. 1995).
Once a named insured grants initial permission to use the insured vehicle, the named insured impliedly consents to use of the vehicle by subsequent permittees unless their "permission" to use the vehicle emanates from a converter. Raitz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 1179 (Colo. 1998).
If the definition of "permissive user" in the insurance policies is more restrictive than the language of the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, the policies must be interpreted in accord with the act, as clauses in an insurance contract which attempt to dilute, condition, or limit statutorily mandated coverage are invalid or void. Wiglesworth v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 917 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1996).
Exclusion of state, federal, police, and fire vehicles permissible exercise of police power. Bushnell v. Sapp, 194 Colo. 273, 571 P.2d 1100 (1977).
Definition of "motor vehicle" does not include snowmobiles. Uninsured motorist statute does not require coverage for accidents involving snowmobiles used off public roads. Keely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 835 P.2d 584 (Colo. App. 1992).
Definition of "motor vehicle" applies to any vehicle with the physical characteristics that require registration and licensing, regardless of whether the vehicle is actually registered and licensed in Colorado. Thus, the act may extend to vehicles registered and licensed in another state. Ranger v. Fortune Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 394 (Colo. App. 1994).
Subsection (8) makes it clear that a title holder is not divested of the duty to insure a vehicle merely by conditional sale or by actual use by the vendee following a conditional sale. It is only after entering into a conditional sale agreement that vests the right of immediate possession in the vendee. Whether the right of immediate possession vests in a conditional vendee ultimately depends upon the agreement of the parties. Sachtjen v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 49 P.3d 1146 (Colo. 2002).
Policy clause that excludes from liability coverage a certain category of permissive users because some other form of coverage exists under a separate policy is inconsistent with the requirements of the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act and contrary to public policy; thus, it is unenforceable. Finizio v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins., 967 P.2d 188 (Colo. App. 1998).
However, insurance policy's "excess clause", which made coverage secondary to other collectible insurance, was not void as an erosion of the statutory mandate of 10-4-619 that vehicle owners carry minimum liability insurance. Court contrasted excess clause, which limited coverage to the extent that other coverage existed, with "escape clause", whereby an insurer provides no coverage if other insurance applied. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 214 P.3d 489 (Colo. App. 2008), aff'd, 246 P.3d 651 (Colo. 2011) (disagreeing with Finizio v. Am. Hardward Mut. Ins. annotated above).
A certificate of title is prima facie evidence that a person is the "owner" of a vehicle; however, it does not represent conclusive proof of ownership. Martinez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 961 P.2d 531 (Colo. App. 1997).
Pursuant to definition of "policy", a snowmobile was not intended to be one of the "only" types of vehicles designated as an insured vehicle subject to the statutory "policy" provisions. Keely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 835 P.2d 584 (Colo. App. 1992).
The definition of "policy" in subsection (2) does not apply to limit the provisions of 10-4-609. Based on the legislative intent that all purchasers of automobile liability insurance policies must have the opportunity to purchase uninsured motorist coverage, under 10-4-609 a car rental agreement may qualify as a "policy" and the car rental company is required to offer the lessee uninsured motorist coverage. Passamano v. Travelers Indem. Co., 882 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1994).
Definition of "motor vehicle" in subsection (2) makes it apparent that the general assembly did not intend for a motorcycle to be type of vehicle designated as an insured vehicle subject to statutory policy provisions. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Gonzales, 902 P.2d 953 (Colo. App. 1995).
The definition of "resident relative" may not be restricted to a single, "primary" residence. State law contemplates that a person can "reside" in more than one place, so long as all relevant circumstances reveal some intended presence in the insured's home. Thus, an insurance policy that required a relative to reside "primarily" with the first person shown as the named insured impermissibly limited statutorily mandated coverage. Grippin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2016 COA 127, 409 P.3d 529.
The definition of "resident relative" does not apply to a separated husband who moved out of the family home with no intent of moving back into the home. GEICO Cas. Co. v. Collins, 2016 COA 30M, 371 P.3d 729.